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Education, class structure and 
income equality 
JAGDISH BHAGWATI,” M./.T., Cambridge, Mass. 
PART I. ANALYTICAL ISSUES 
The relationship between education and income 
equality has always been a question of interest to 
economists and sociologists. However, the critical 
interaction of economic theory, and its paradigms, to 
this question has rarely been made explicit; and the 
fact that one can emerge with radically different 
points of view on the question, depending on the 
analytical scaffolding which one scales in examining 
this question; is only now beginning to emerge into 
formal discussion. 
Basically, one can distinguish between two 
fundamentally different kinds of questions in this 
area. (A) Given the initial income distribution, the 
working of the labour markets and other related 
characteristics of the economic system in a society, 
can the expansion of educational facilities and the 
educated labour force improve income distribution in 
the sense of reducing income inequality? (B) Given 
the political system, particularly in the sense of the 
class structure and its influence on the pattern and 
level of educational expenditures and subsidization 
by the State, can educational expansion be expected 
to improve income distribution? 
(A) The former question has traditionally been 
approached in the fashion of the current proponents 
of the ‘human capital’ doctrine: for earned-income 
distribution, it is assumed that education provides the 
skills which lead to increased reward. Alternatively, as 
some sociologists have recently argued, education 
provides the ‘socialization’ (e.g., docility, punctuality, 
discipline, etc.) which permits the individual to 
absorb on-the-job training more readily, a view which 
equally suggests that the educational process works to 
increase reward by raising an individual’s pro- 
ductivity. Either way, it follows that if the supply of 
educated labour could be increased at the expense of 
uneducated labour, the income inequalities would be 
reduced. Thus, Barbara Wootton quotes and critically 
comments on Cannan on this issue as follows: 1 
‘Forty years ago, in a discussion of the first of these 
factors [cited to explain the inequality of incomes, i.e., 
the restriction of supply of educated labour arising from 
the high cost of the training required], Professor Cannan 
pointed out that, if differences in earnings are to be 
reckoned as the return on capital invested in the 
acquisition of professional skills, such investment must be 
quite exceptionally remunerative; and it might, indeed, 
well be asked why money is not “spent in training more 
young people for the occupations of *superior advan- 
tageousness until the competition reduces this excess of 
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advantageousness to nil?” Professor Cannan himself found 
the answer in the fact that “the conditions of human life 
have not hitherto allowed the spending of money in this 
way to become an ordinary investment to which savings 
can be attracted in the ordinary way by the expectation 
of interest. They have not done so because society has not 
thought fit to provide means by which money could be 
advanced to young people for their training on terms 
which would make the lenders secure of recovering their 
money with interest.” (Cannan, Wealth (London: King, 
1914) p. 199.) In the forty years that have elapsed since 
these words were written, society has, however, 
experienced a considerable change of mind upon this 
question. Today money is not even loaned to young 
people for their training: it is largely provided free. If 
Professor Cannan and the economists have the whole 
truth of the matter, the destruction of the financial 
barriers to higher education initiated by the Education 
Act of 1944 should reduce the “excess advantageousness” 
of professional skills very nearly, if not quite, to nil. But 
from any such result as this we are still, clearly, a very 
long way off: and. . . to anticipate any such outcome is 
to reckon without the formidable social pressures that are 
at work to prevent it.’ 
To take another recent example of this kind of 
conventional wisdom, Assar Lindbeck in his recent 
diagnosis of the political economy of the new left in 
the United States commits himself to the following 
view: 2 
‘Of course, the nationalization of physical and 
financial capital by itself would have important, not to 
say drastic, effects on the distribution of income, wealth, 
and power in society. The most obvious substitute for 
nationalization of human capital is probably nationaliza- 
tion of (part of) the return on human capital, for 
instance, by progressive taxation. A’much more efficient 
method, in the long nm, is probably an expann’on of the 
educational system to increase tbe supply of highly 
educated people, thus influencing wage differentials. ’ 
* In writing this paper, I have benefited much from the com- 
ments of, and correspondence with, Asim Dasgupta, P. R. 
Panchamukhi, Pravin Visaria, K. Sundaram, Padma Desai, 
Arvind Shah. J. Krishnamurti, John Petter@, Paul Streeten. 
Richard Eckaus, John Mellor, Richard Shortlidge, Jr.. Robert 
Lucas, Sam Bowles and tbe members of the Political 
Economy and Theory Seminar at MIT. Some of the evidence 
cited on the paper was also supplied to me by Sundaram, 
Panchamukhi and Visaria; and Daagupta has provided 
excellent research assistance, financed by the National 
Science Foundation. The paper is divided into three parts for 
convenience. The substance of Part II, in a highly abbreviated 
and early form, is published in Essays to be presented to 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, edited by Gopal Tripathi, et 
al., 1972. 
1. Barbara Wootton, The Social Foundations of Wage 
Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 19.55) Chapter 1 on 
‘Some Economic Curiosities of British Wage Structure’, p. 51. 
2. Assar Lindbeck, The Political Economy of the New Left 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971) p. 58; italics inserted in 
the last sentence. By ‘efficient’, it may be noted, Lindbeck 
means ‘effective’ rather than ‘optimal’. 
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However, take an alternative stylized paradigm 
where education is essentially a process of acquiring a 
credential with which you can outcompete someone 
else who lacks it-the kind of thing one observes 
typically in India with people acquiring steadily more 
degrees-M.A., LL.B., etc.-and successfully bidding 
for jobs which ‘require’ objectively nothing more 
than literacy! One can then conceive of the economy, 
at any point of time, as consisting of a number of 
jobs with different rewards/price-tags attached to 
them. This job distribution may be historically and 
sociologically determined: e.g., as Rend Dumont has 
observed for French Africa, the colonial salaries of 
the French civil servants in Africa were generally 
taken over by the succeeding African civil servants;3 
and the pattern of wage and salary differentials 
among different occupations is a clearly complex 
business4 Sociologically, educated labour would 
outcompete uneducated labour; and the more the 
education, the greater the access to the higher-paid 
jobs: this could be one of the principal rules of the 
game, defining the access of different groups to the 
different jobs. Under this paradigm, which does not 
in any way attribute higher productivity to more 
education but merely says that-society works so that 
the better-paid jobs are given to the more educated- 
and this may be because of notions of ‘fairness’ or 
that ‘education should be rewarded’-the effect of 
shifting the population from the uneducated into the 
educated category is to filter the educated down into 
the top jobs of the uneducated, thus lowering the 
average real income of the uneducated as also of the 
educated (if we think of only two homogeneous 
groups, for simplicity). The net result may well be to 
widen, rather than narrow, the average-wage 
differential between the two groups, in contrast to 
the Cannan-Lindbeck type of assertion, thus 
increasing, rather than reducing, income inequality as 
a consequence of the educational expansion.5 
Clearly therefore the economic paradigm of the 
labour market and the role of education in that 
market makes for a critical difference in the expected 
impact of educational expansion on income 
distribution. For the bulk of non-professional 
education, which means over 60 per cent of the 
Indian educational expenditure, I would argue that 
the latter ‘job-access’ paradigm is indeed the more 
appropriate one, and not the ‘human-capital’ or the 
‘socialization-hence-increased-productivity’ 
paradigms; and that we need to ltevise our notions on 
social returns to investment in education as also on 
the impact of educational expansion on income 
distribution accordingly.6 Note also that, tiy 
hypothesis, the job distribution being pre-defined, the 
Cini coefficient should remain unchanged with more 
education-so that income equality in thut sense is 
also not improved. 
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unchanged, the social return to the extra educational 
expenditure is zero, whereas looking merely at the continuing 
differential private returns to the educated vis-24s the 
uneducated, a pure ‘human-capital’ type of economist would 
conclude erroneously that the marginal (social) return was 
positive. 
6. Four other observations are in order. (a) The ‘job-access’ 
paradigm is deliberately painted here in its simplest form; and 
hence, in its rejection of the view that education is socially 
productive, it does not fully mirror reality (while capturing 
its essence for liberalarts education far better than the 
productivity-based paradigms). .The economist looking at this 
paradigm is therefore going to be tempted to reject it as 
‘simplistic’ and not in conformity with the reality. However, 
it should be remembered that all paradigms and theories are 
essentially abstracting from some aspects of reality: that is 
indeed what theory is all about, as distinct from history. The 
only relevant quesrion is whether this paradigm is more 
insightful than the alternative. ones, in understanding the role 
of education in the economy. In this connection, it is 
interesting to note that (as Lindbeck, op.cit., also does) 
economists typically tend to dismiss Galbraith’s contention 
that tastes are determined by firms via advertising in the 
advanced capitalist societies, by producing evidence showing 
that some firms fail despite advertising, that products also 
occasionally fail in this fashion, and so on, while failing to 
realise that their own classroom exercises where they start 
with the assumption that a consumer has given tastes and 
then proceed to discuss welfare results such as the consumer 
cost of protection, etc., are equally unrealistic in ignoring the 
evidence of some taste formation by advertising: and that 
they should judge each paradigm ss a paradigm rather than 
judge one yua its paradigmatic quality and the one they do 
not like by confronting it with some ‘noise’ from the real 
world! 
(b) In case it bothers the reader whether a general . . 
equlhbrium model could be built which takes the distribution 
of jobs with pre-ussigned price-tags as one of its central 
features, the answer is in the affirmative. Models with sticky 
wages, for example, are easy to build: recent examples are the 
Harris-Todaro model for discussing urban employment, and 
ones built by me to analyse the phenomenon of over- 
qualification and the problem of the brain drain, all of which 
work with pre-sssigned sticky wages and adjust the labour 
market through the creation of open unemployment. Cf. 
Harris and Todaro, ‘Migration, unemployment and develop- 
ment: a two-sector analysis,’ American Economic Review. 
March 1970; Bhagwati and Hamada. ‘The brain drain, 
international integration of markets for professionals and 
unemployment: a theoretical analysis’, 1972 (mimeo); and 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan, ‘Overqualification. education and 
welfare: a theoretical analysis’, 1972 (mimeo). 
(c) K. Arrow has analysed higher educational expenditure 
on the basis of a yet different paradigm: ‘Higher education, 
in this model, contributes in no way to superior economic 
performance; it increases neither cognition nor socialization. 
Instead, higher education serves as a screening device, in that 
it sorts out individuals of differing abilities, thereby 
conveying information to the purchasers of labour.. The 
screening or fifter theory of higher education, as I shall call it, 
is distinct from the productivity-adding human capital theory 
but is not in total contradiction to it. From the viewpoint of 
an employer, an individual certified to be more valuable is 
more valuable, to an extent which depends upon the nature 
of the production function. Therefore, the filtering role of 
educarion is a productivity-adding role from the private 
viewpoint; but, as we shall see. the social productivity of 
higher education is more problematic.’ Cf. Arrow, ‘Higher 
education as a filter’, Stanford University, 1972 (mimeo) 
pp. 2-3. Arrow does not spell out the implications of his 
paradigm for income inequality, however. 
(d) The ‘job-access’ paradigm, in an ‘adulterated’ form 
bent in the direction of incorporating some productivity 
effects, vitually underlies also the arguments of Lester 
Thurow in ‘Education and Economic Equality’, I’ubfic 
Inwrest, No. 28, Summer 1972, where he argues against 
conventional economic wisdom on this question and talks of 
‘job-competition’ as contrasted with the conventional ‘wage- 
competition’, also contending chat U.S. data on income 
distribution better match chc job-competition model’s 
predictions. 
3. Cf. Rend Dumont, c&e Start in Africa (New York: 
Praeger, 1969). 
4. See, for example, Barbara Wootton, op.cit., Chapter 1. 
5. In this model, since the social product remains 
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(B) But we can probe a little further and ask 
whether the class structure has anything to contribute 
to this issue. The most obvious question here is: 
which classes manage to get their children educated, 
so that they get access to the better jobs? 
In a complete Becker world, where the capital 
markets are so perfect as even to equalize the returns 
on human and physical capital, this question has the 
obvious answer that it truly does not matter: each 
decision-making unit earns equal returns to 
investment at the margin in equilibrium, here and 
now, and both rich and poor have automatically 
equal access to education and better-paid jobs. 
But, for those who do not accept this 
Chicagoesque view of the world, the question of the 
class distribution of the benefits from the educational 
process is pertinent to the problem of equality. 
Two different approaches to this interaction may 
now be differentiated, one which is to be attributed 
to Bowles, and the other which I propose to develop 
later in this paper at some length. 
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benefits from the pattern of educational expansion in 
a country. All rates of return which I have seen are 
therefore nothing but crude averages which have little 
meaning if we seek to analyse this important 
question. 
(ii) Next, note that it is implausible to base an 
argument on the assumption that the allocation of 
resources in the absence of a bias from the class 
structure would be such that the rates of return to 
different types of education would be equalized. 
Capital markets are imperfect, segmented in many 
cases between different parts of the country and 
between different sectors of the economy, and again 
it is not sensible to claim that the opportunity cost of 
capital, against which the rates of return are to be set, 
for the lower classes, in India for example, is as 
favourable as to the middle and upper classes. 
(iii) Finally, the rates of return used by Bowles do 
not distinguish between private rates of return, social’ 
rates of return which allow for the (often enormous) 
State subsidies to education as costs, and social 
returns which additionally allow for externalities 
(e.g., literacy may make agricultural extension less 
expensive) and non-economic effects (e.g., 
Morris-Jones has found a statistical relation between 
the proportion of votes cast for the Communists in 
Indian elections and the literacy rate in a con- 
stituency). l O As it happens, there are quite enormous 
differences, thanks to heavy State subsidies to 
education, between the first two measures (leaving 
out the problems of measuring the last one). 
The Bowles hypothesis 
Sam Bowles, in an interesting discussion of this 
problem,7 has argued that in capitalist LDCs (among 
whom India qualifies), the benefits from higher 
education tend to go to the dite groups and the 
benefits from primary education to the masses; given 
the influence of the class structure on State action, 
therefore, one should expect that capitalist LDCs are 
likely to overspend resources on higher education and 
underspend them on primary education. 
The most telling argument that he produces in 
support of his thesis is that one should expect, in an 
ideal world, that the returns to education, both 
primary and higher, should be equal. However, if one 
finds that the returns to higher education are below 
the returns to primary education, that indicates that 
those who determine policy have pushed resource 
allocation to higher education too far; since the tlite 
groups are likely to benefit from higher education 
and the masses from primary education, this indicates 
that capitalist LDCs pursue a resource-allocational 
policy which is favourable to the klite gro~ps.~ 
Furthermore, it may be argued, if private and social 
returns are identical, then this is also a sub-optimal 
result.9 
This conclusion is clearly of great interest in 
linking up educational policy to the class structure in 
a country. However, 1 have a number of reservations 
about Bowles’s procedures: 
(i) First, 1 do not believe that, for LDCs such as 
India, it makes sense to compute even private rates of 
return to any kind of education unless the vast 
asymmetries in the costs and benefits facing different 
classes and groups are noted and the rates of return 
are computed separately for these classes. The 
computation of aggregate rates of return ignores these 
significant asymmetries and therefore cannot really 
cope adequately with the problem of the influence of 
economic power and class structure on the receipt of 
7. See his ‘Class power and mass education’, Harvard 
University, October 1971 (mimeographed). 
8. Whether this would also lead to accentuated relative 
income inequality between the two groups, the Elites and the 
masses, would depend on the precise model of eduation and 
labour markets which is deployed, and there seems to be no a 
priori reason to deduce any result one way or the other. 
9. Bowies’s paper is quite rich in ideas, and I am concen- 
trating merely on the major empirical test that he sets up and 
checks out against evidence on rates of return to alternative 
types of education in a number of LDCs. 
10. This, of course, does not ‘prove’ anything: rice- 
consumption is also nicely correlated with leftwing politics 
in India! But there may well be a more meaningful link 
between literacy and Communist inroads into a constituency 
than between the latter and rice consumption! Morris-Jones’s 
results were reported by him in a seminar at M.I.T. in early 
1972. 
It may also be noted that the relationship of literacy to 
politics has been thought often to go the other way! Thus, 
the Indian Education Commission had the following to 
assert: ‘In spite of all odds, Indian democracy has given a 
fairly good account of itself so far. But it will not be 
permanently viable unless its foundations are deepened by 
the creation of an educated electorate, a dedicated and 
competent leadership and the cultivation of essential values 
like self-control, tolerance, mutual goodwill and considera- 
tion for others a11 of which make democracy, not only a form 
of government, but a way of life.’ (p. 3). This view accords 
with the view of the function of schooling, taken in some 
recent radical writings in the U.S., e.g., Sam Bowles, ‘Unequal 
education and the reproduction of the social division of 
labour’, 7‘he Heview of Radical Political ~Lconomics, 
Fall/Winter 1971. 
footnote continued on page 24 
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Alternative hypothesis 
For these reasons, I would reject Bowles’s precise 
argument but advance a related but different 
hypothesis as follows: 
For each class of education, the State (in capitalist 
LDCs) will subsidize the cost of‘ education; the 
benefits of these subsidies will accrue disproportion- 
ately less to the poorer groups at each level of 
education; tbe higher the educational level being 
considered, the higher will be the average income- 
level of the groups to which the students belong; and 
the rate of governmental subsidization to higher 
education will be greater than that to primary 
education. 
This hypothesis is based on the view that the 
pattern of governmental subsidization of education 
will reflect class structure, that the classes that 
benefit more from (any) education in general will be. 
the higher-income groups-as is indeed the case with 
capitalist governmental subsidization in any area: e.g., 
the beneficiaries of cheap credit and fertilizers to 
promote the Green Revolution have tended to be the 
bigger farmers; that the income levels of the 
recipients of State subsidy via education would be 
greater for those attending higher education than 
those attending primary education; that therefore the 
rate of subsidization would be greater for higher than 
for primary education, given the greater political 
clout of the upper-income groups in general. 
The reason why I expect the ability to receive the 
benefit of educational subsidies to vary inversely with 
income level is that, as I argue later in this paper, the 
costs of education tend to be higher and the returns 
from it lower, the lower the income level, by and 
‘large. 
The reason why education generally is an excellent 
vehicle for the State to be so handing out subsidies, in 
effect to the better-off groups, is possibly a complex 
issue. But a hypothesis that readily suggests itself is 
that: 
The benefits can be banded out to Clitegroups by 
the State without obvious disaffection if they are 
handled via the educational system which, in 
principle, at least, is open to all classes and castes and 
therefore conceals effectively its inegalitarian impact. 
How does this mechanism of interaction between 
the class structure and educational expenditures 
affect equality? The impact on earned-income 
distribution would depend critically on the paradigm 
one chooses from those outlined earlier: as the higher 
education expands more than it would if it were 
privately paid for, the effect on earned-income 
distribution (say, the Gini coefficient) would 
critically depend on what this expansion of the 
educated labour force implies, which in turn depends 
on the economic paradigm one is working with.’ 1 
But one implication for equality in a broader sense 
seems clear. By enabling some lower-income groups 
to educate their children so as to have access to the 
better-paid jobs for the educated, the process of 
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educational subsidization is likely to generate a 
greater sense of mobility and hence of equality than 
would otherwise obtain in a capitalist society. Of 
course, with Marcuse, one could argue that this is no 
more than a way of obscuring the inequality that 
obtains and is possibly even accentuated by the 
educational programme. On the other hand, the fact 
would remain that one of the results of even an 
inegalitarian educational process could indeed be to 
generate a greater sense of equality, 
capitalist system paradoxically more 
palatable to the lower-income groups.l* 
making the 
viable and 
PART II. INDIAN EVIDENCE 
1. Introduction 
In Part I of this paper, I advanced the following 
hypothesis on the interacti0.n of class structure with 
educational expenditures: 
For each class of education, the State (in capitalist 
LDCs) will subsidize the cost of education; the 
benefits of these subsidies will accrue disproportion- 
ately less to the poorer groups at each level of 
education; tbe higher the educational level being 
considered, the higher will be the average income- 
footnote continued from page 23 
It may also be noted that missionary educational activities 
in the heathen countries were inspired by the notion that 
education would tilt the now-enlightened to Christianity. 
Thus, the American missionary, David Allen, wss to write: 
‘In commencing their operations, missionaria have generally 
seen the propriety and importance of establishing schools. 
One reason for them is to educate the minds of the people so 
that they may be more capable of understanding and 
appreciating the facts and evidences, the doctrines and duties 
of the Scriptures. Another reason for them is to increase the 
influence of missionaries with the people by communicating 
some advantages which they can appreciate, and by showing 
that Christianity rests upon an intelligent perception of its 
doctrines, and contains reasons for the performance of all its 
duties. And another reason for such education is in its 
procuring means and opening ways of access to the people, 
and opportunities for preaching to them.’ India: Ancient and 
Modem (Boston: John P. Jewett and Co., 1856) p. 567. 
11. For a general equilibrium treatment of this issue, where 
the labour market is set up so that the educated are given 
job-preference over the uneducated, education is paid for by 
the State and undertaken until the expected wage to 
educated labour equals the expeczed wage to uneducated 
labour, and the market allows for unemployment-a model 
which applies to India, 1 believe, see the paper by T. N. 
Srinivasan and myself, op.cit. 
12. The sense of equality is a function with many arguments, 
and not just income distribution. Aside from the sense of 
mobility, the arguments would generally include (0) the 
availability of ‘basic’ goods to the poor-e.g., the more the 
basic needs of the poor are satisfied, the more unequal the 
distribution can be (Cf. Tibor Scitovsky, ‘Equity’ in Papers 
on Welfare and Growth (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964) 
p. 255; J. Bhagwati. The Economics of Underdeveloped 
Countries (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966) p. 22; 
and my essay in J. Bhagwati ted.), I;conomics and World 
Order: From the 1970s to the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 
1972)); and (b) The presence of conspicuous consumption by 
the rich-e.g., the more the rich consume conspicuously, the 
less acceptable will be any particular degree of income 
inequality. 
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level of the groups to which the students belong; and 
the rate of governmental subsidization to higher 
education will be greater than that to primary 
education. 
I now propose to discuss empirical evidence for 
India which seems to corroborate .the parts of this 
hypothesis which relate to the differential access of 
different income-groups to educational opportunity, 
thanks to differential costs and returns. Sections 2 
and 3 discuss these issues for primary and higher 
education respectively. 1 3 
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2. Primary education 
The little sociological and economic ,evidence 
which I have been able to find supports the notion 
that the lowest-income groups typically have not 
been able to have the same effective access to primary 
education as the higher-income groups because, for 
them, (i) the opportunity cost (of labour) of primary 
education is higher, (ii) the benefit from primary 
education is lower, (iii) the private rate of return to 
them from such education is therefore lower, and at 
the same time (iv) the cost of capital, against which 
such rate of return must be compared, is higher than 
for the higher-income and caste groups. 
These hypotheses are based on the following 
assumptions about the lower income groups: 
(i) The opportunity cost of labour, resulting from 
the fact that children of primary-school age cannot 
work during the time that they attend school, is 
higher because typically these groups can and do use 
children of this age in gainful work whereas this is not 
possible (or allowed) with the other, higher-income 
groups.14 
(ii) The benefits from primary education are 
lower for these groups again because (a) the 
probability of finding the rural jobs such as primary 
schoolteaching, post office and such other jobs 
requiring primary (and secondary) education is lower 
for these groups; (b) if higher returns accrue through 
increased productivity on the farm, it is unlikely to 
accrue in full to the educated but low-income landless 
labourer whereas these returns would accrue fully to 
the educated but richer landholding farmer; and (c) in 
so far as the higher returns accrue through higher 
mobility to the urban sector where jobs requiring 
primary education (e.g., watchmen in Delhi colleges) 
are relatively less scarce, the lower-income groups 
with less urban contacts and generally lower mobility 
would correspondingly have less access to such 
returns from primary education. 
(iii) At the same time, clearly, in a world where 
many of the members of the lower-income groups, 
especially in the rural areas, have indebtedness at high 
rates of interest, their opportunity cost of capital is 
greater than that of the middle- and upper-income 
groups in general; this asymmetry is further 
reinforced by the general banking and lending 
practice of charging higher interest rates to the 
smaller borrowers. 
Evidence for these hypotheses should not be 
difficult to find. A good example is to be found in 
Oscar Lewis’s careful account of Rampur in northern 
India in 1953. His analysis clearly confirms in a broad 
way the arguments set out above. It is best to quote 
him:ts 
’ . . . In terms of primary school attendance the castes of 
the village fall into three groups which cut across the 
usual caste rankings in some respects. The relatively low- 
caste Nais and Khatis are grouped with the Jats and 
Brahmans in the category with highest school attendance; 
the Camars and Jhinvars form an intermediate group, 
while the Chipis, Lohars, Kumhars, Dhobis. and Bhangis 
(mostly low castes) make up the group with lowest school 
attendance. [See Table 1.1 As part of the national effort 
to raise the lot of untouchables, Harijan (low-caste) 
students are not only exempt from the 2-annas-per-month 
school fee but may apply for special scholarships of 1 or 2 
rupees per month. But only some Camar families have 
taken advantage of this opening. Although the Bhangis 
and Dhobis make up fourteen of the village’s 150 families, 
they have no children in the primary school, and the 
Kumhars, with seven families, have contributed only one 
student. Economic and occupational factors seem to be 
involved here. The group with highest school attendance 
includes those with the most economic security, 
especially in the case of the Jats, who are the landownas 
of the village. It also includes occupational groups (Nai 
and Khati) whose work does not demand the help of 
children in the 5-14 age bracket. There is no great 
demand at present for the services of the barber and 
carpenter, and in their work children can be of use 
primarily after twelve years of age. In the case of 
Kumhars, however, children can be put to work at various 
unskilled or semiskilled tasks: carrying clay, breaking the 
clods, adding water, taking care of the donkeys. The same 
may be said of the Bhangis. Since the struggle for 
livelihood is serious, it may be hard to spare children in 
13. I have not been able to get the evidence to support the 
two other elements of my hypothesis: (i) the relative ranking 
of the average income-level of the participants in higher and 
primary education; and (ii) the relative rates of subsidiaation 
by the State of higher and primary education. I expect to 
return to these two aspects later, when I have managed to 
gather the necessary data in a usable form. I might note here, 
however, that the hypothesis could be sensitive to whether 
the subsidy to education is defined per student or as a 
percentage of total education cost per student. I should also 
remind the reader that the total, general-equilibrium impact 
on relative class benefits from education would have to 
consider both the effects on earned-income distribution (as 
per Part I) and the distribution of the tax burden implicit in 
govemmentll subsidy to education. 
14. It is worth mentioning here that there are institutionrrl 
factors which disproportionately affect the opportunity cost 
of sending children to school among the lowest-income 
groups. Among these is the pattern of school vacations, for 
example. As Balogh and other left-wing economists have long 
observed, the vacations were set in the colonial countries to 
coincide, as far as possible, with the routines of the ruling 
country rather than to coincide with the harvesting seasons, 
as in Europe. The vacations in the primary schools, which are 
predominantly in the rural areas, thus are not well 
synchronized in India either with the need to have the 
children of the small cultivators and landless labourers on the 
farm during harvests, thus contributing to dropouts and low 
enrolments of such children from primary education. A 
parallel is to be found in Robert Coles’s eloquent and 
impassioned study of migrant workers’ children in the United 
States in his Uprooted Children: The Early Life of Migrant 
Farm Workers (Perennial Library Paperback, 1971 I, where he 
describes the disorientation of these children in the schools 
which are not organized to meet the needs of these itinerant 
children, and the resulting dropouts and/or impairment of 
their educational process. 
15. Oscar Lewis, Village Life in Northm India, pp. 42-5. 
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the 5-14 age group when their work is of real assistance 
to the family. Some lower-caste informants also said that 
untouchables are di scriminated against to some extent at 
the schools and are not treated as well as the higher-caste 
children. Moreover, education is not always seen as an 
asset. When there are educated villagers without jobs, the 
value of such raining may be called into question.’ 
Lewis’s data and description also strongly suggest 
that the income levels of the two major castes with 
high enrohnent rates, the Jats and the Brahmans, as 
also of the Khatis, are significantly higher than of the 
low*nrolment castes. 
I would expect that these results hold broadly for 
most parts of India. Also, data on dropouts from 
primary school should also confirm my general thesis 
here: even when participation is tried, it may not be 
carried through to completion, because of the realiza- 
tion that the rates of return are significantly low in 
relation to cost of capital, by the lower-income and 
caste groups.16 
The available data on enrolment and attendance in 
primary education, from surveys and census inquiries, 
indeed underline these conclusions, although the data 
are not often as sharply defined as one would wish. 
Table 1. School attendance, ages 6-1.5, 
Rampur, 1953 
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6 7 13 
0 0 0 





4 6 10 
1 0 1 





9 4 13 
6 0 6 





4 5 9 
4 4 8 
























































Source. Oscar Lewis, ~ilhgge Life in Northern India, p. 44. 
Thus, Table 2 gives the summary results of a study 
of 20 villages in the Punjab and the Eastern U.P. 
Stat& of India, showing the children attending 
primary schools as a proportion of eligible children is 
distinctly higher when the income level rises above 
Rs.l,SOO per annum ($200, at the prc-August 1972 
Table 2. Income classification and primary school 
attendance4J.P. (Eastern Districts) and Punjab 
Cbildrm mending 
lncomr Number as 0 pcrcanrnge of 
classi- of tbc total number 
village /iaztion~ bouu- of cbildrm in 
holds tbc income group 
I. Wnlidpur A 134 10.26 
B 50 43.30 
2. P&Ilpur A 93 4a.00 
B 17 66.67 
3. Mohdpur Gvnulpur A 88 24.56 
B 29 50.00 
4. Kahnjar A 116 35.37 
B 26 so.00 
5. Patci Behuipur A 56 7.32 
B 21 42.86 
6. Sohrlpur Cara A 60 2.33 
B 39 9.30 
7. Gad A 92 7.89 
B 2s 20.59 
8. Ghiil A 81 9.09 
B 57 36.96 
9. Purcnn Pandey A 122 17.89 
B so 43.14 
10. Zahidpur A 48 lS.38 
B 46 12.20 
11. Kann R&mat Khan A 196 16.79 
B 69 28.09 
12. Rata Khera A 48 46.67 
B 29 60.00 
13. Bhatim A 44 21.S7 
B 37 60.98 
14. Kukv Majra A 40 so.00 
B 46 58.49 
1s. svan A 59 11.11 
B 83 43.37 
16. Bnhaurwas Bhondu A 93 44.30 
B 4s 51.16 
17. Rataul Rohi A 62 30.00 
I3 SO 26.67 
18. Sakrali A 54 7 .JO 
B 62 39.13 
19. Mehriana A 99 57.14 
B S8 68.49 
20. Sochania A 91 32.93 
B 69 52.94 
Note. 1. A - Annual income below Rs.1.500. 
B - Annual income above Rs.1.500. 
Source. Priwraly Education in Rurul India: Participation and 
Wastage, Agricultural Economics Research Center, Delhi 
University, May 1968 (mime01 p. 39. 
16. The low enrolments in some low-income groups, 
however, may also reflect the faLzor listed by Lewis: the 
social harassment from castes refusing to mingle with the 
harijans and related low-caste children. More is said on this 
issue later in the paper. 
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Table 3. Caste-classification and 
primary school attendance 
parity). Poor families thus show lower, and indeed 
low, enrolment rates for their children in the primary 
schoo1s.l 7 
Cbildrm attending 
Cnsrc Number school as D perccnrrrgr 
cl‘&- of of the tota/ nvmbrr 
VillogP ficnrionl house- of children in 
holds tbe caste grouf~ 
1. Walidpur H. 116 14.14 
N.H. 68 34.78 
2. Pnlmpur H. 94 49.25 
N.H. 16 23.08 
3. Mohdpur Gvmalpur H. 117 34.07 
N.H. “A. Il.% 
4. Kalinjnr H. 67 31.43 
N.H. 75 49.02 
5. Patti Behnripur H. 38 3.70 
N.H. 39 31.43 
6. Sohnlpur Garn H. 77 8.06 
N.H. 22 n.a. 
7. Gati H. 37 0 
N.H. 80 16.88 
8. Ghinnn H. 80 9.84 
N.H. 58 40.00 
9. Purenn Pmdcy H. 105 18.95 
N.H. 67 41.18 
10. Zahidpur H. 36 10.34 
N.H. 58 15.79 
11. Karra Rnhmat Khan H. 55 66.25 
N.H. 210 23.71 
12. Rartn Khm H. 46 32.76 
N.H. 31 84.38 
13. Bharian H. 53 27.54 
N.H. 28 73.91 
14. Kukar Majrn H. 38 38.24 
N.H. 48 66.04 
15. Saran H. 39 17.14 
N.H. 103 37.63 
16. E~&nutwas Bhondu H. 24 32.25 
N.H. 114 49.06 
17. Racaul Rohi H. 32 31.82 
N.H. 80 26.42 
18. !&km& H. 60 9.59 
N.H. 56 48.00 
19. Mehtiurn H. 104 51.65 
N.H. 53 79.66 
20. sochania H. 73 53.78 
N.H. 87 so.54 
Note. 1. H. - Harijans (Untouchables). 
N.H. - Others. 
Source. Same as for Table 2, op.cit., p. 44. 
Table 4. Proportion of children (S- 15 age group) 
attending school according to occupation groups, 1962 






All groups 48.9 
Source. Report of the Programme Evaluation Organization 
(PC), Problems of Extension of Primary Education in Rural 
Areas, New Delhi, 1964. 
Table 5. Proportion of households sending 
children to primary school, by occupational groups 
of households, 1962 
Occupation group 
(Cultivators) 
School Non-School All Villages 
Villages Villages (Weighted)1 
Big 84.4 66.0 75.0 
Medium 73.6 48.1 60.1 
Small 64.0 46.2 54.6 
Landless Labourers 51.5 35.6 43.1 
Note. 1. The weighting is by percentage of school and non- 
school villages, the percentage of the latter being 53. 
Source. Same as for Table 4, op.cit. 
The results of a sample survey reported in the 
Report of the Programme Evaluation Organization 
(Planning Commission), 1964, relating to school 
attendance in the 5-15 age group (which corresponds 
somewhat roughly fo the primary school age group) 
also were indicative of the same fact-that attendance 
varies monotonically with economic status and 
income. Thus, Table 4 shows that the ‘big’ farmers 
sent a higher proportion of children fo school than 
the ‘medium’ farmers, these in turn higher than the 
‘small’ and the landless were trailing last. The same 
conclusion seems to follow from a slightly different 
statistic. Table 5 gives the proportion of households 
sending children to primary school, by occupational 
groups of households, showing again that this propor- 
tion varies directly with the occupational/income 
level by broad groups of cultivating househo1ds.l 8 
The evidence of low enrolments and attendance by 
the poorer groups thus seems to corroborate the 
hypotheses about the opportunity costs of (primary) 
education being high& for the poorer groups and the 
returns lower. On the other hand, we may well ask 
whether there is direct evidence for these hypotheses 
and also whether other factors, say sociological, may 
not account for the low enrolments and high drop- 
outs among the poorer groups. Let me deal with these 
two problems, in turn. 
As for direct evidence, Table 6 tabulates the 
reasons stated by households in the villages included 
in the P.E.O. (1964) study, just cited, for not sending 
their children to school. Interestingly, financial 
difficulty (by which is meant the costs of books and 
other direct costs of school attendance, as distinct 
from the income foregone by attending the school) 
cropped up far more significantly for the landless 
labour group (which is at the bottom of the scale of 
income distribution in India) than for other groups, 
and even more strikingly so for boys rather than girls 
(a difference which I will presently discuss). Once 
again, we have data here which are not ideal-e.g., a 
family that cites financial difficulty may at the same 
time have been influenced almost as much by some of 
the other factors, and ranking families by principal 
reason cited could be misleading-blotting out this 
17. It should be noted again that the correlation between 
ranking by ‘castes and by income classes is not necessarily 
strong throughout India. However, as Table 3 shows, if one 
confines oneself only to untouchables versus the others, tbe 
conclusion about enrolment does carry over; but this is 
almost certainly because the untouchables are at the bottom 
of the income distribution. 
18. Ideally, these data should be adjusted for varying 
proportions of male and female children-the female 
participation in schools is significantly lower than male 
participation for all classes, but may vary between them-and 
other social characteristics which may vary differentially 
between the classes distinguished in the tables. For such 
reasons, it is best to regard these data as indicative of the 
relations which I am talking about, rather than as definitive 
evidence in support thereof. 
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Table 6. Reasons for not sending children to school (asgiven 
by parents) by broad occupational groups 
(classified by percentage of households citing a principal reason) 
Reasons 
All Villages (weighted) 
Boys G iris 
Landless Landless 
labour other thnn labour other than 
households labowen households labowen 
1. Financial difficulty 
2. School at a distance 
3. Cattle grazing 
4. Needed for farm work 
5. Needed for domestic work 
6. Indifference 
7. Under aged 
8. Marriageable age 
9. Social barrier 







































Source. Same as for Table 5. 
mformation-but they are sufficiently corroborative 
of the argument in this paper. 
As for the non-economic reasons which may 
account for the low enrohnents and high dropouts 
among the low income groups, there are enough 
reasons to believe that, by and large, they are less 
important than the economic reasons discussed in this 
paper. 
(i) I have already stated that the relationship 
between caste, for example, and income is not 
necessarily strong. Thus, low enrolments and high 
dropouts by low-income groups cannot really be 
explained by the fact that the low-income groups are 
low-caste groups with difficult access, on social 
grounds, to education. 
(ii) The ‘social barrier’ reason in Table 6, which 
was presumably to pick up this kind of reasoning, is 
negligible for boys and applies, in the case of girls, 
only to the higher-income groups (‘other than 
labourers’). 
(iii) Sociological evidence also confirms that caste 
reasons such as untouchability have not been, over 
the years, quite so important a barrier to schooling as 
one might imagine. It is worth reproducing here the 
telling account in the classic work, Behind Mud Walls: 
f930-Z960, by William and Charlotte Wiser, of the 
educational problems of the untouchables in the 
village of Karimpur near Agra, which indicates 
accurately the fact that, while the progress in 
removing the stigma of untouchability has not been 
dramatic, it is still substantial in secular areas such as 
education and that the economic reasons focused on 
in this paper are clearly the dominant ones today in 
holding back the access of the poorer and bottom 
strata to educational opportunities: 
The 1930 Situation in Karimpur 
‘Whenever we have tried to secure for the untouchables 
some social or economic benefit which seems to us the 
reasonable right of any member of the community, we 
have come into conflict with the wills of some of our best 
friends. Our latest endeavor has been in education. Muni, 
our pastor’s only son, is nine years old. The father 
expressed the hope that his son might have advantages 
greater than his own. The fist logical step was to get the 
boy starred in regular school work. We consulted the 
master of the District Board School in our village. He said 
that if we would wait until the beginning of a new term, 
we could enter Muni in the school. When the new term 
opened we sent Muni. The master had been with Christian 
boys in a town school, and saw nothing heretical in the 
presence of a Christian. But to the village boys Muni was a 
bbangi. 
‘At noon of the first day, all the older boys took their 
books and slates home, and refused to return to school. 
The smaller children returned. But at the close of the 
afternoon session, when .their parents became aware of 
what had happened, they were thoroughly bathed. On the 
following day a few children from the lower castes 
answered the roll call. From then on, ail fifty were absent, 
and Muni remained the lone pupil.. 
‘A month passed. The Sahib was the first to introduce 
the subject one evening while with a group of leaders. He 
asked why it would not be possible for this boy, with no 
taint of the bbangi about him or his parents, to learn 
along with more fortunate children? The boy had 
expressed his willingness to sit apart from the others. He 
was not going to school for the purpose of touching them. 
He could learn without touching them, just as all of his 
untouchable neighbors did everything else without 
touching any member of the village. 
‘Then the village leaders expressed their feelings. The 
government had no right to upset the established order by 
allowing children from any caste or untouchable group to 
attend school. And the Sahib was making a great mistake 
in giving a bbangi the notion that he could learn. If the 
boy must be taught, let him learn from his own father. Or 
let there be a separate school for such boys.’ 
Karimpur in 1960 
‘My figures on school attendance for this year are limited 
to children of Karimpur proper. The concil president 
reports that there are 306 boys and girls in the village 
between the ages of six and twelve. There are 96 
Karimpur boys enrolled in the school and 32 girls. The 
amount of “wastage”. that is the number of drop-outs, is 
suggested by the fact that in the first and second grades 
combined there are 44 boys and 14 girls, while in the 
sixth grade there are four boys and two girls. At least half 
of the members of each class are Brahmans. Kacbbis are 
the next most numerous. Other castes have one or two in 
a class-carpenters, water carriers, potters, shepherds, 
sewing men, goldsmiths, flower growers, and leather 
workers. There are also a few Muslims. There are no 
children of the two washerman. families in school, and this 
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is easily understood when one watches them at work all 
day beside the pond. There are no oilsmith children nor 
dbanuks, who belong, like the washerman, to groups 
below caste lines. And there are no Christians, also classed 
as below caste lines because all Christians in Karimpur are 
converts from the sweeper caste. This is disappointing 
after all the effort on the part of the Christian pastor to 
make it possible for his son to attend. I thought our 
Brahman friends responsible for the exclusion of the 
Christians, but this they denied. Later 1 talked with 
Christian parents, who said that no objection had been 
raised to their children’s attending, but that they just do 
not see enough benefit from school attendance to 
compensate for the trouble of sending them. They say 
they cannot afford the fees-which are extremely small. 
In addition there are books to be purchased, and there is 
the problem of clothes. School children are dressed 
simply, like their parents, but they do look neat and their 
clothes are clean. The dhobi will not wash clothes for the 
Christians as he does for others, because they are the 
sweepers and he considers them too dirty. The scavenging 
duty they do for the village makes it difficult for the 
mothers to keep their children clean. In addition to their 
own cooking and household work, they must spend hours 
every day in other homes, making them clean for other 
people’s children.’ (Wiser, op. cit., pp. 180-l.) 
(iv) But if factors like low caste and untouch- 
ability are no, longer important in reducing the 
accessibility to education, what about sex? It is well 
known, and the data in Table 1 also underline this, 
that the enrolment of girls is significantly lower than 
that of boys, as a proportion of those eligible to enrol 
within each category. It would appear that the fact of 
lower enrolment of girls, on the average, fits in with 
(a) either the view that social factors directly inhibit 
sending girls to school OY (b) the view that the econo- 
mic returns to educating girls are lower and that 
parents, when faced with the choice of investing in 
the education of boys or girls, prefer the former. 1 am 
inclined to the latter view, though clearly social 
factors do help in reducing the returns from girls’ 
education. For, not merely (as elsewhere) is the 
probability of finding an equally remunerative job 
generally lower for girls than for boys, given the same 
ability and education, but girls typically marry and 
merge into their husbands’ families whereas boys 
generally in a patrilineal society are supposed to look 
after their own parents in old age-which is a social 
factor affecting the parental returns to girls’ educa- 
tion adversely. 1 9 
In any case, the fact that low-income groups 
participate disproportionately less in the educational 
process could be linked up with the lower female 
enrolments, and the arguments for it produced here, 
by arguing further that, while there is no reason to 
expect a different sex-ratio in the children of the 
lower-income groups, the facts (a) that education in 
girls is less likely to be a socially-valued (and hence 
dowry-reducing) good at low income levels, and (6) 
that girls in the lowest-income groups are more likely 
to have useful household chores and hence higher 
opportunity costs for attending schools than girls in 
higher-income groups with domestic servants, are 
likely to accentuute the disadvantage in investing in 
girls’, as distinct from boys’, education.20 If so, we 
should be able to observe, not merely a lower 
enrolment rate among the lower-income groups but 
also a relatively higher male-sex-ratio in their enrol- 
ment.21 Such data, however, are not systematically 
available to my knowledge-though, Table 1 would 
seem to support this hypothesis. 
Clearly, therefore, more empirical evidence needs 
to be collected and analysed to sort out the relative 
importance of the social and economic factors which 
inhibit the participation of the low-income groups in 
the primary education process, although there is 
enough prima facie evidence and supporting argument 
that can be advanced to indicate that the economic 
factors are the more important.22 I would also like to 
see a systematic, empirical examination of whether 
there are factors which are tending to reduce the 
differentials in rates of return to primary education 
by different classes and thus ensure a steadily less 
19. In economic terminology, the market here is imperfect. 
Over time, there could be a tendency however to have the 
dowry (traditionally paid by parents to sons-in-law in many 
parts of India, though not all) reduced .when the daughter is 
educated: though, here again, this may be, not because 
educated brides are expected to produce more income but 
because they are socially valued over uneducated ones. 
20. The view taken in the text seems to be further 
corroborated by the’evidence on nutritional levels among 
6-24 month-old children, produced by Jim Levinson, The 
Morinda Experience: An Economic Analysis of tbe 
Determinants of Malnutrition Among Young Children in 
Rural India, Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, June 
1972: ‘The greater premium placed on sons than on 
daughters clearly results in major differentials in their care 
and upbringing. . . the [lower-income] Ramdasia female 
child not only is breast fed for a shorter time period than the 
Ramdasia male, but consumes less supplementary milk and 
less solid food, begins consuming solid food later, and 
receives less of each of the nutrients.’ (pages 75-6). 
Levittson’s excellent work also indicates strongly that the 
higher-income Jat families are also characterized by 
differential, lower nutritional care of female children but that 
this differential is accentuated among the lower-income level 
Ramdasia families where resources for nutritional care are far 
more tight. Yet another supportive evidence for 
discrimination against females is the finding at the Narangwal 
Rural Health Research Center in the Ludhiana district of 
Punjab, directed by Dr. Carl Taylor of the Johns Hopkins 
University Department of International Health, which shows 
higher infant mortality rates for females (196 per 1000) than 
for males (125 per 1000) for this area (Cf. Levinson, opcit.). 
21. John Mellor tells me that his Indian agricultural studies 
also indicate a disproportionately lower enrolment of girls 
from the lower-income classes at primary level. Jim 
Levinson’s nutritional studies in the Punjab indicate one 
additional reason why this may be so: the incidence of 
malnutrition involves very high family-labour input for 
dealing with the diarrhoea which frequently follows 
malnutrition in this area, and the ‘h&our-intensity of 
treatment tends to increase as one goes down the income 
ladder (as people substitute labour for expensive medical 
treatment, at the margin). This could presumably be one of 
the major sources in the demand for ‘domestic help’ 
addressed to girls from the lower classes by their own house- 
holds. 
22. On reading the penultimate draft of this paper, Richard 
Shortlidge, Jr., of Cornell University, who has worked on 
Indian education in 14 villages (12 in Badaun district and two 
in Nainital district), communicated to me that he has found 
‘a direct relationship between the household’s income and 
the participation of children in school’ and that ‘the labour 
force participation rates and the school participation rates for 
boys follow an inverse relationship.’ He also confirms the 
importance of access to urban jobs as affecting educational 
motivations. 
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inegalitarian distribution of the subsidies to primary 
education. Thus, are the participation rates rising and 
dropout rates falling in specific areas for the lower- 
income groups over time; and is this phenomenon to 
be explained in terms of increasing benefits (among 
which would be State-provided measures such as 
quota-determined access to jobs and to subsidized 
higher education, increasing access to jobs owing to 
exogenous factors such as growth of surrounding 
towns or influx of governmental programmes, etc.) or 
lower costs (among which would be State-provided 
subsidies to these groups for school-attendance)? 
3. Higher education 
Blaug et al. have recorded the results of a 1954 
graduates survey, which show that the average 
monthly incomes of the families from which they 
come are strikingly higher than for the population as 
a whole: Table 7 has the data. Table 8 underlines this 
also for professional (as distinct from liberal-arts and 
general-science and commerce) education: the heavy 
preponderance of students in the income groups over 
Rs.150 per month-way in excess of the per capita 
income of the country, which is now approximately 
Rs. 100 per month-is evident. 
If we shift the focus now to higher (post- Why do the lowest-income groups show so poorly 
matriculation) education, it can again be argued that in higher educational attendance? The hypothesis of 
the State subsidies meted out through this educa- this paper, that the opportunity costs tend to be 
tional area are also differentially accruing to income higher and the benefits lower, the lower the incomd 
groups depending on their economic status. groups, seems to be the main reason (although ‘social 
Not merely is the college-participation rate for the conditioning’ and ‘value differences’ among different 
lower-income groups likely to be much lower than for income groups may also play a role, as some socio- 
the middle and upper-income groups; even within the logists have argued). 
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latter groups, the participation rates are likely to be 
linked to the income level. This is because again both 
the opportunity costs of education would tend to be 
higher and the benefits lower, the lower the income 
groups. 
Table 7. Distribution of families of 1954 graduates and of all families: 
by average monthly family income (per cent) 
Average monthly 
income of family 
(Rs.) 
Percentage of Percentage of 
graduates’ families all fan&3 
Men Women Total Urban Rural 
500 and above 22.7 28.4 23.3 4.0 0.9 
200-499 45.8 44.5 45.7 15.7 8.5 
Below 200 29.9 22.1 29.1 80.3 90.6 
Not known 1.6 5.0 1.9 - - 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Blaug et al.. The Causes of Graduate Unemployment in India 
Table 8. Family background of students in professional colleges, polytechnics and technical training institutes, 1965 
(per cent) 
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AgFiCWhd Training Technical 
C&gC-S PoIytecbnics Institutes Instituter 
4 7 14 
11 12 2 21 
27 25 15 38 
59 56 83 28 
5 8 4 11 
27 32 19 39 
7 19 13 22 
58 29 43 16 
2 13 22 12 
41 57 41 68 
59 44 59 32 
100 100 100 100 
2,818 47,900 7,399 2.980 
I1 172 28 25 
i 
Source: Blaug et al., op.cit. 
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Thus, I would expect that the returns to lower- 
income groups would be lower for two main reasons: 
(i) for equivalent qualifications, the sons (and 
daughters) of the more prosperous families would 
tend to get better-paid jobs;23 and (ii) again, for 
equivalent qualifications, they would also generally 
get jobs quicker, thus procuring higher returns from 
earlier employment. Both these hypotheses seem 
eminently plausible from casual observation of the 
employment situation in the urban areas. 
Table 9. The incidence of unemployment, by sex, 
among households with different levels of income, 
in Greater Bombay, 1971 
Household Income 
(Rupees per Month) 
Incidence of Unemployment 
Crude Standardized~ 
MALES 
And, interestingly, the second of the factors listed 
here seems to be supported by some Ceylonese and 
Indian evidence that 1 have seen recently. Thus, Table 
9 shows that the incidence of unemployment seems 
to be highly concentrated, in this socio-economic 
survey in Bombay city for 1971, on the lower-income 
families-suggesting that the frictional (and possibly 
some chronic) unemployment tends to be heavily 
concentrated in the lower-income groups which 
presumably have greater difficulty in finding jobs in a 
scarce-job situation,24 A similar result for Ceylon is 
evident from the results of a socio-economic survey, 
1969, reported’in Table 10. 
100 or less 11.23 38.49 
101-200 8.48 7.41 
201-300 5.48 9.54 
301-400 6.13 5.01 
401-500 5.12 3.89 
501-750 4.44 3.08 
751-1000 3.00 1.82 
1001-1500 3.90 5.19 
1500+ - 
ALL 5.69 5.69 
FEMALES 
It should be possible; through suitably designed 
surveys, to pick up evidence on the hypotheses 
advanced here. Thus, to test whether indeed 
higher-income parents’ children do get higher starting 
salaries and/or accelerated rises in their salaries (adjust- 
ing for other factors such as quality of degree, level of 
100 or less - - 
101-200 , 6.41 4.98 
201-300 31.05 31.82 
301-400 11.39 9.85 
401-500 15.94 12.27 
501-7.50 10.27 6.37 
751-1000 2.88 2.77 
1001-1500 3.55 5.60 
lSOO+ - - 
ALL 9.65 9.65 
Nore. 1. The age distribution of the total population of 
surveyed households is used as the standard. 
Source. ASurveyundertaken on behalf of theC.LD.C.O., 1971. 
Table 10. Distribution of all households and of unemployeds’ 
household of residence by income group, 1969 (Ceylon) 
Urban Rural Estate 
Unemployed by Unemployed by Unemployed by 
One month household of household of household of 
income AN residence All residence All residence 
bouse- bouse- bouse- 
holds Male Female Total holds Male Female Total holds Male Female Total 
Rs. - 200 24 21 16 19 48 37 35 35 62 45 40 42 
200 - 399 39 40 50 43 35 37 30 34 34 45 56 47 
400- 599 16 20 13 17 11 18 25 21 3 10 2 9 
600- 799 9 10 10 10 4 6 8 7 1 - 2 2 
800 - 999 5 5 6 6 1 1 - l - - - - 
1,000 + 7 4 5 5 1 1 2 2 - - - - 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 loo 100 100 100 100 
Source. Socio-Economic Survey, 1969, 1st round, unpublished; reprinted from P. J. Richards, Employment and Un- 
employment in Ceylon (Paris: O.E.C.D. Development Center, 1971). 
23. John Pettengill has remarked to me that if the differential 
return is due to parental incomes giving more contacts, the 
higher return is a rent to that differential income level rather 
than a return to education. This is correct but irrelevant to 
my argument since I am taking the position that the better 
job would not have been available without the educational 
qualification. Except in cases such as where a tycoon can put 
his illiterate and boorish son into the highest job in his own 
business and get away with it, the ability to land a better job, 
thanks to greater influence, requires that the disparity 
between your own educational qualification and that of your 
rival with inferior influence appear not excessively 
conspicuous. Hence, I believe that the education is necessary 
to enable the influential to earn the rent accruing from the 
influence; hence, this rent can properly be ascribed as a 
higher return to education by these income groups. 
24. Ideally, the data here, as also in Table 10 for Ceylon, 
should have been broken down by the level of education 
among the unemployed, the quality of the degree (e.g., first 
class, second class, etc.), the length of unemployment, etc., if 
the hypotheses I am advancing in this paper are to be truly 
contrasted against facts. 
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education), it would be necessary to survey the urban 
firms which offer employment, with individual 
employees being the objects of the survey. The usual 
unemployment surveys could, on the other hand, be 
amplified to check on the length of unemployment 
and the social and economic background of the 
unemployed, to turn up evidence on my second 
hypothesis. 
I might add, however, that (as in many branches of 
economic analysis) there may be a U-shaped 
behaviour and the unemployment rates may tend to 
fall at the very low income levels, rather than rise as 
per my second hypothesis, because (as J. 
Krishnamurti has pointed out to me) the capacity of 
members of the lowest-income families to hold out 
for better jobs is seriously limited and they must take 
whatever happens to come by. This may partly 
account for the fact that Table 9, for example, does 
not uniformly support my hypothesis for each class 
as against the ones above and below it, while showing 
that the higher classes on the average have lower 
unemployment rates than the lower classes. All that 
this means, however, is that these classes are more 
likely to be getting inferior wages, the more they shift 
from ‘waiting-for-adecent-job’ type of unemploy- 
ment to accepting any job. Thus, the basic argument 
of this paper remains unaffected. 
I should also add one more corroborative piece of 
evidence, due to Panchamukhi and Panchamukhi. 
These authors have, in an important contribution, 
analysed the relationship between earnings and socio- 
economic variables as evidenced in the survey of 
Bombay for 1954 initiated and financed by the 
Research Programme Committee (Planning Com- 
mission). While they cite interesting evidence of the 
role of sex and other variables in ‘explaining’ income 
differentials, they also show that there is indeed a 
significant effect of family incomes on the income 
earnings of an individual.* 5 
4. ‘Higher-higher’ education 
and overqualification 
Before 1 conclude, let me comment on one more 
aspect of higher education, which is increasingly 
relevant to LDCs such as India. The political pressure 
for subsidizing higher education has evidenced itself 
in the expansion of higherdegree institutions in 
India, so that the business of getting a degree to beat 
the next man to a job which does not require that 
degree at all gets to a point where higher degrees 
(M.A., Ph.D.), and more degrees (M.A., LL.B.), are 
sought to compete successfully against the candidates 
with lower and/or less degrees (again for jobs which 
do not require this qualification, in an objective 
sense, in the first place). 
This process of politically-determined State 
subsidization of higher-higher education, accompany- 
ing a process by which jobs get filled with. ‘over- 
qualified’ people, is clearly evident in India. It could 
be readily documented, as it has not been so far, by a 
systematic survey which would, for example, 
compare the ex ante (advertised) educational require- 
ments as also the ex post ‘revealed’ educational 
requirements in a job filled by vacancies at different 
points of time. I would guess that, for many jobs 
(such as ‘lower division clerks’ in the Indian bureau- 
cracy, to take one example), the candidates of later 
vintages would also show more years of schooling 
and/or more degrees.2 6 
This process of ‘overqualification’ has not merely 
the obvious implication that the private and social 
marginal product of higher-higher education will 
diverge. It also means, because of the State subsidiza- 
tion that I have pointed out, that those who manage 
to go further up-thanks to better resources-in the 
educational ladder, get the advantage of the State- 
subsidy and thus also to compete more effectively 
against the economically less well-endowed. 
Yet another consequence of this phenomenon of 
overqualification has been the effect on the quality of 
education. The expansion of higher education, meting 
out more and higher degrees in a labour market which 
works by overqualification, leads typically to 
emasculation of courses so that, to acquire the same 
knowledge as ten years ago, one has to go to ‘school’ 
for more years-a situation which, with sticky wages 
and costs, implies increasing real costs. At the same 
time, the objective of maintaining any high-quality 
educational institutions for pursuit of science at the 
highest levels becomes steadily more difficult to 
achieve.27 In this regard, the inherited English model 
of a university with a federal structure has been the 
cause of more inefficiency than an American- 
25. For details of the methodology and quantitativ 
estimates, see Panchamukhi and Panchamukhi, ‘Socio- 
economic variables and urban incomes’, Department of 
Economics, Bombay University, 1969; now published in N. H. 
Pandit, ‘Measurement of cost, productivity and efficiency 
of education’, National Council of Educational Research and 
Training, 1969, pp. 306-36. 
26. Bhagwati and Padma Desai, Planning for Indurtrializa- 
tion: India (O.E.C.D. Development Center, Oxford 
University Press, 1970) had a story to illustrate both the 
overqualification thesis and the problem of influence: 
‘ . . . education was being demanded by larger numbers of 
candidates purely as a means of “beating the next man to the 
job”, with educational requirements for many jobs thus being 
upgraded in consequence. An apocryphal story, with a 
double twist, runs: in response to an advertisement for the 
job of a floor-sweeper, the applicant with higher secondary 
school education was dismayed to find a rival with a B.A. 
degree, who in turn faced a rival with an M.A.. to be capped 
by an applicant with a Ph.D. (in the art of sweeping), only to 
find that the job ultimately went to the son-in-law of the 
advertiser.’ (p. 83). An early, empirical paper which briefly 
considers the phenomenon of overqualification is R. S. 
Eckaus, ‘Economic criteria for education and training’, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1964; and. 
recently, theoretical analyses have been undertaken by 
Bhagwati, Srinivasan and Henry Wan, Jr. 
27. This objective has legitimately been emphasized in 
Indian educational-policy reports. Cf. The Indian Education 
Commission’s statement on this issue: ‘India. must make 
her own contribution as an intellectual and cultural equal to 
the eternal human endeavour to extend the frontiers of 
knowledge.’ (op.cit., p. 3). 
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J a p anese model of ‘each-College-is-a-University’ 
would have been. As I argued many years ago:28 
‘In the majority of English-tradition countries, 
universities are also examining bodies. The growth of 
colleges, affiliated to these universities, inevitably leads to 
lower standards all round because of bad entrants. The 
best solution under these circumstances is not to use the 
federal structure at all. As in Japan and the United States, 
each new college should be permitted to run its own 
instructions and examinations. Its standards, if bad, will 
not then affect those of the other, better institutions. It is 
only when everyone has to swim together that the good 
institutions suffer from the bad. A scheme of decentralisa- 
tion would at least preserve the better ones.’ 
Indian thinking has recently begun to move in this 
direction, in attempts at increasing the number of 
universities, freezing the burden of enrolments at 
maximum levels for existing universities, ‘bribing’ 
‘advanced centres’ of research at universities with 
rewards so that they may preserve better standards in 
the face of pressures to lower standards, etc. But the 
basic sub-optimality of the English model, which 
continues to dominate the scene, has not sunk into 
the thinking to make for any dramatic change in this 
area of education. 
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PART III: SOCIALISM AND 
THE LIMITS OF EGALITARIANISM 
1. Socialism and education 
Clearly, therefore, it would appear that. the 
higher-income groups manage to get the subsidies 
which come via either primary or higher education; 
and educational subsidies would not appear to be 
quite the egalitarian instrument they are often 
believed to be. In fact, as is so often the case with our 
mixed economy, the benefits of State subsidization 
seem to accrue predominantly to the higher-income 
groups, no matter what the area of subsidization. 
Such an outcome may be the inevitable result of a 
political system which attempts to combine 
progressivism with a basically unchanged political 
structure. It may be that the income groups which 
would benefit from these educational subsidies are 
politically more powerful and manage to use 
education, which is considered socially progressive, 
nationally a matter of pride, and in principle an 
instrument of egalitarianism, to distribute relatively 
innocuously to themselves the benefits of State 
expenditures. If one accepts this thesis altogether, 
there is little scope for shifting the distributional 
impact of educational subsidies in the desired 
direction of the lower-income groups. 
However, one might take a more optimistic view 
and argue that partly the result has been the outcome 
of an inadequate understanding of how difficult it is 
to have programmes truly be beneficial to the lower- 
income groups when economic opportunity and 
political muscle are likely to make the higher-income 
groups more capable of taking the State-subsidized 
opportunities under governmental programmes. 
Economists have certainly aided and abetted in this 
outcome, by concentrating on nearly everything 
except income distribution in their major concerns; 
the calculation of dubious numbers, masquerading as 
rates of return to education undifferentiated by social 
class and caste, is only one case in point. 
If one believes that there is indeed some degree of 
freedom to introduce reform in the distributional 
impact of State subsidies to education, clearly the 
answer lies in broadening the employment 
opportunities to the lower-income groups and 
lowering their opportunity costs, by suitable policies. 
These policies must include a reallocation of the 
educational subsidies, at all levels of education, so as 
to redirect them to the lower-income groups such 
that the richer groups pay for their children’s 
education fully, whereas the poorer groups are 
subsidized. They would also include an enhanced 
quota-wise reservation of jobs for these groups. But, 
quite aside from quotas, we need to attack the 
present economic regime’s built-in discrimination 
against the lower-income groups, which we noted in 
Part II, by ensuring that institutional devices are 
invented and implemented which ensure equal 
economic opportunity for people from different 
economic and social backgrounds. There is need to 
examine the present working of the labour 
markets-for different levels of education and 
differentiating between the public sector, the 
bureaucracy and the private sector-to devise such 
policies as will ensure truly equal opportunities for 
all. 
Let me suggest one possible scheme, which should 
be appropriate, for example, for hiring clerks in all 
kinds of offices. Rather than work with the current 
practice of hiring people from the vast pool of 
available people with the requisite B.A., or similar 
qualifications, by the principle of ‘who knows whom’ 
which works against the underprivileged and lower- 
income groups, why not require that there be a 
random selection from the qualified applications? We 
could require that such jobs would have to be 
registered with the Employment Exchange; all 
applications which meet the necessary qualifications 
would then be pooled and then lots drawn to make 
the appointments. Such a system would be a useful 
supplement to the special-examination system under 
which the top governmental services are recruited and 
which works, on balance, quite fairly. 
Another such egalitarian move would be to rule 
out legally the widespread practice of appointment of 
the sons of businessmen to lucrative managerial 
positions by these businessmen in ‘their’ public 
limited companies and thus to insist that these 
positions be available to the public on merit. *9 
28. Cf. Bhagwati, 
Countries (London: 
The Economics of Underdeveloped 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, World 
University Library, 1966) p. 186. 
29. I am well aware that the possibility of ‘swaps’ among 
business houses, and other such evasion possibilities, would 
have to be ruled out as well. 
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continue into the later years of child-rearing and early 
youth as well, only underlines the fact that no 
‘catching up’ in any significant way, even when 
feasible with improved nutrition, would be available 
for such underprivileged children. Their ‘competitive’ 
edge, and hence true. equalization of educational 
outcomes and success at getting better jobs vis-&is 
the higher-income groups with adequate nutritional 
standards, are certain therefore to be unachievable. 
(ii) The psychological and sociological evidence 
on the importance of ‘environmental’ factors 
associated with family rearing in the critical ages of 
three to five, as also their impact at later ages in 
imparting educational motivation etc., also underlines 
the de fucto inequality of opportunity that is likely 
to go with the accident of which income class you are 
born into. The poorest families, in the bottom three 
income deciles in India, surely do not have the 
financial and cultural means to provide the kind of 
environment that the first three deciles from the top 
would have-_ 
(iii) Finally, the higher-income groups confer an 
unequal advantage on their children by being able to 
invest more money in their education either by giving 
them better-quality education through more 
expensive private schools or by chat common Indian 
phenomenon of hiring private tutors to improve 
performance at critical competitive exaininations 
such as the Matriculation, the Intermediate Science 
and Bachelor’s Degree level examinations. In the 
general case, where scarce admissions go by perfor- 
mance, this practice invariably manages to give a 
significant edge, ceteris paribus, to the children of the 
upper three to five decile groups and a significant 
disadvantage to the groups below. 3 * 
30. Often, the public-sector plants, recruiting at many levels 
in the same way as the private sector firms, have merely 
replaced private-sector discriminatory practices with similar 
public-sector discriminatory practices in countries such as 
India. . 
31. Heinz Eichenwald and Peggy Fry, ‘Nutrition and 
learning: inadequate nutrition in infancy may result in 
permanent impairment of mental function’, Science, 163 (14 
February 1969) pp. 644-8. This paper cites the various 
studies on which its conclusions are based; the authors also 
carefully note why the evidence is not yet fully conclusive on 
many points, while strongly leaning in the direction suggested 
in the text here. 
32. A minor paradox may be noted here. Occasionally, the 
ability of the poor, but talented, students to pursue higher 
studies has been improved by the fact of being hired by the 
rich fo tutor their children. A vignette of some interest is 
provided by Nikolay Valentinov in his Encounters with Lenin 
(Oxford University Press, 1968) when he notes his 
revolutionary days at the Polytechnical Institute in Kiev and 
his intellectual debates with Bulgakov, then Professor of 
Political Economy there: ‘Probably because I was a frequent, 
loquacious, and very loud opponent of his at these gatherings 
and in his seminar, Bulgakov took nore of me as someone 
who especially needed to be liberated from the harmful 
“spell” of Marxism. I saw Bulgakov very frequently. He 
helped me to obtain books and even lent me them from his 
own library, and he drew my attention to interesring articles 
in the foreign press; in addition, he took a lot of trouble to 
help me earn my living. Thanks to him ,I got work on the 
Kievskaya Gazeta [Kiev Gazette] and was hired to give some 
marvellously well-paid mathematics lessons in the family of a 
rich merchant who had come from Siberia.’ (pp. 156-7). 
Unless such imaginative new practices are devised, 
and the mere expansion of public sector employment 
is not regarded nai’vely as synonymous with the grant 
of equal opportunity for a1J30 education cannot 
become the instrument of egalitarianism in the 
manner we have traditionally assumed it to be. 
2. Limits of egalitarian policies 
But even if these policy changes were actively 
adopted, the fact remains that the genuine 
equalization of educational opportunity (in the sense 
of equalization of costs and benefits from any level of 
education) would not follow for all classes because of 
three further reasons. 
(i) The recent evidence on the effect of pre-natal 
and neo-natal nutritional deficiency on neural growth 
and mentation indicates strongly that early deficiency 
in nutrition can cause lasting damage to the 
intellectual ability-and hence to eventual ability to 
go through a sustained educational process on equal 
terms with those not so deprived and afflicted. 
Eichenwald and Fry report the following evidence on 
this issue: 3 l 
‘ . . experiments on various animals have indicated that 
nutrition inadequate in calories and protein. coinciding 
with the period in life in which the brain is growing most 
rapidly, produces a brain which is not only smaller at 
maturity than in control animals but also one which 
matures biochemically and functionally at a slower 
rate.. . The brain of the mature rat malnourished during 
infancy is not only physically smaller but histologically 
may show degenerative changes of neurons and 
neurological cells. 
‘These data suggest that inadequate protein nutrition 
or synthesis, or both, during brain development could 
result in changes in function and that, if the degree of 
deprivation were sufficiently severe and prolonged. the 
changes in function might be permanent. Orher 
experimental observations do in fact indicate that 
insufficient intake of protein during early neural 
development affects mentation. In rats and 
swine, . . . protein deprivation in early life. . . reduces the 
capacny of the experimental animal to learn at a later 
age. Furthermore, rats born of and suckled by 
malnourished mothers are similarly deficient in their 
learning apacity. 
‘Protein-calorie malnutrition in the human infant, if 
severe enough, produces two clinical conditions-infantile 
marasmus and kwashiorkor . . . The early investigators of 
proteincalorie malnutrition in infanu found that apathy 
was universally present in these children . . . The electrical 
activity of the brain in protein-malnourished children 
shows consistent abnormalities in the form, frequency 
and amplitude of activity. . . Follow-up studies of 
children who have been treated for infantile mar-us 
and kwashiorkor indicate that during recovery they first 
grow physically with great rapidity. However, if 
observations are continued over sufficiently long periods, 
the child never completely catches up with his healthy 
peers; growth stops at the usual chronological age . . . the 
intellectual attainments of children who have recovered 
from a clinically severe episode of protein-calorie 
malnutrition are consistently lower than those of 
individuals with adequate nutrition during infancy.’ 
Thus if nutritional levels, especially the protein 
intake, are inadequate in pre-natal and early neo-natal 
stages in the lowest-income groups, as indeed they are 
in India, the intellectual ability of the children in 
these classes will almost certainly be impaired; and 
the fact that malnutrition is morally certain to 
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I do not believe that, within the ‘capitalist’ mode 
of socio-economic organization, it is possible to 
eradicate significantly the inequalities arising in these 
ways. 
(i) An appioach to assuring minimal nutritional 
standards, for example, could be made via the 
distribution of free, nutitionally-balanced meals at 
school-though, with primary education essentially 
beginning at six, the critical effects of pre-natal and 
neo-natal malnutrition would already have wrought 
their havoc. Also, assuring free meals to children of 
ages six to thirteen throughout the country for the 
bottom half of the population, for example, is 
probably a proposal that would not be met with 
enthusiasm because of its cost-indeed, it presupposes 
a degree of egalitariansism which is somewhat 
improbable in the existing framework. Nonetheless, it 
is an approach that needs to be seriously 
considered-for it would, in providing this subsidy 
linked to school atteddance, also lead to increased 
participation of the lowest-income groups in primary 
education.33 The disexternality of such a subsidy, 
however, is that it could well lead to a marginal 
incentive against population control: the fact that 
malnutrition may no longer be caused for the family 
by the addition of more children may be removing an 
important reason for adopting family planning 
measures. If such a disincentive effect is to be 
avoided, it may .be useful to restrict the free meals to 
a limited number of children per (nuclear) family-a 
policy that may, however, be politically unpopular 
and administratively unfeasible (e.g., could one really 
exclude a child from such a programme when the rest 
of the child’s classmates are enjoying its benefit?). 
(ii) As for the differential effect of family rearing 
and environment, this is really difficult to eliminate 
under the existing societal framework. The 
availability of day-care centre facilities to the poor 
classes could help; but it would cost a great deal if the 
centres are to recreate the environmental conditions 
of the higher-income families, while at the same time 
it would be some time before these centres were 
accepted and utilized by the lowest income groups, if 
at all. Thus, again, the feasibility of this policy 
instrument to eliminate the unequal environmental 
disabilities of the children of the poor seems 
extremely dubious. 
(iii) The inequalities arising from more intensive 
or higher-quality education by the better-off parents 
are again relatively intractable. Special quotas in the 
better schools for the poorer classes would help; but 
nothing really can be done to eliminate the advantage 
conferred on the children of the better-off by private 
tuition. 
(iv) By contrast, it would appear that the Chinese 
communes have actually gone a long way towards 
achieving genuine equality on these counts. (a) The 
significant .equalization of income and consumption 
has eliminated malnutrition as existing under the 
earlier unequal distribution. (6) At the same time, the 
greater equalization of what I called the ‘environ- 
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mental’ effect also follows from the reduced 
income-inequality, the alleged availability of 
commonly shared school and day-care-centre 
opportunities within the communes and the possible 
sharing of a common ethos on societal and individual 
goals and motivations, while private hiring of tutors is 
apparently not practised,34 thus ensuring greater 
equality of educational outcome among those who 
attend school. 
There are really no policy instruments in the 
framework of an LDC such as India to match these 
spectacular possibilities in the Chinese model-thus 
reinforcing the general view that China’s major 
achievement is in the sphere of income and general 
egalitarianism, rather than in its growth rate (which 
has, in the absence of reliable statistics, spawned as 
many controversies around @estimates’ as 
ideological differences and a willing suspension of 
33. Of course. in so far as the nef cost of sending their 
children fo school remains, on balance, too high for rhe 
lowest-income groups, the programme will still not result in 
more enrolment and better nutrition: the ‘elasticity of 
supply’ of enrolment from the lowest-income groups may not 
be high enough! Indeed, there is some evidence that the 
nutritional-assistance progrzunmes in India have not always 
been successful in percolating down to the lowest-income 
poups-as is evidenced in a recent study by Gunvant Desai of 
the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, to which 
John Mellor has drawn my attention. 
34. Seymour Martin Lipset has independently nored this 
source of inequality and cites the following, interesting 
evidence for the socialist countries: 
‘In 1969, the Rector of Moscow University, discussing the 
advantages which some applicants had in gaining admission, 
pointed to the fact that “many children frequently make use 
of the services of private coaches”. In that year, 85 per cent 
of those admitted to the Faculty of Mechanics and 
Mathematics at this university had received private special 
instruction before they took the entrance examination. This 
fact provoked Komsomobkaya Pravda (the Young 
Communist newspaper) to comment: “With the approach of 
summer, many teachers af higher educational institutions 
display feverish activity . _ . For the duration of the coaching 
‘boom’ some even give up their summer holidays . _ . They 
have made out a scale of payments for their services: the 
average fee is 5 rubles an hour, but the children of well-to-do 
parents pay more. . . . Some fond fathers and mothers will go 
to any lengths to obtain a ‘guarantee’ that their son or 
daughter will be accepted. Behind the closed doors of 
secluded houses, countless meetings and ‘confidential’ 
negotiations take place [since some of the tutors are 
‘prepared, on the basis of their connections, to guarantee 
success in the entrance examinations.1 ” ’ ‘Social mobility 
and equal opportunity,’ Public Interest, Fall 1972, pp. 
102-3. 
But, as is typical with conservative intellectuals, Lipset’s tone 
and argumentation suggest that this puts the Communist and 
the capitalist countries on a par-and only a critical reader 
will sit back and realize that the degree to which these 
advantages can be secured via private tuition when income 
and wealth differentials are dramatically lower is going to be 
correspondingly lower, in general. 
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discretion and disbelief will generate). 3 5 The problem 
of ensuring to the children of the lower-income 
groups genuine equality of access (in its fullest sense) 
to education must thus remain one at the solution to 
which the capitalist LDCs would thus appear to 
remain inept and inferior, in principle, to LDCs 
following the Chinese model. In all these regards, 
therefore, the success of genuine egalitarianism in 
China would seem to be impressive, and not merely in 
the matter of reducing income differentials (whether 
rural v. urban, region 0. region, educated v. 
uneducated) to which Sinologists have drawn our 
attention.36 
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visitors to the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s. but also 
in the light of the ,evidence for China itself in this direction. 
Thus, Merle Goldnian has noted, in her Literary Dissent in 
Communist China (New York: Acheneum, 1971) the struggle 
of Chinese writers, of revolutionary vintage, who were to be 
discredited again and again, through several lapses into 
deiiberalization and hard-line policies, for opting out of 
revolutionary romanticism (which dictated that only utopian 
situations be depicted) and preferring social realism (which. 
in its original version, required that the ‘real conditions’ be 
portrayed). 
On the latter question, one should like to know, for 
example, who gets sent off to Tibet and Sink&g, and who 
stays on in Peking and Shanghai, who manages to get 
better-paid jobs, and whether these decisions reflect class 
structure or other sources of influence and power within the 
system. These are issues on which neither the Soviet Union 
nor China is agreeable to having critical scrutiny; and the high 
incidence of sons-in-law (of Soviet Premiers) and wives (of 
Chinese leaders) in the high positions in these societies, no 
different from what tends to happen in capitalist societies, 
suggests thar perhaps everything is not all right on this front. 
Indeed, according to Katz, ‘Sociology in the Soviet Union’, 
Problems of Communism, 20 (May-June 1971). there are 
distinct differences in the participarion in higher education 
by different classes in the Soviet Union, the classes 
considered being ‘peasants’ versus ‘urban intelligentsia’. 
36. See, for example, Shigeru Ishikawa, ‘China’s economic 
landscape: 1965-1995’. in Bhagwari (ed.), Economics and 
World Order. op.cit.,‘p. 344. 
35. To reach a full judgement on the issue of equality, 
however, in the Chinese society today, one should ideally 
have (a) better and more systematic information so thar the 
presumptions noted in the text are checked out in the same 
scholarly way that we have learnt to do regarding all 
professions by all governments; and, in particular, (b) some 
notion of how assignments to jobs work out-for equally 
educated people (which relates to the question of equalicy of 
success in finding jobs, for all, for identical qualifications). 
On the former question, ir would be wise to withhold full 
judgement, nor merely in light of the discrepancies between 
professions and realities which escaped even discriminating 
